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owners, said that in any given case concerning riparian or littoral rights,
the court must necessarily give due considerationto the correlative rights
of adjoining upland owners. 5
Yet, in holding for the plaintiff in the instant case, the court looked
solely to the fact that the state owned the submerged land in front of
the property, using a rule that has thus far been used only to determine
ownership of accretions to islands in rivers, rather than along the
shore of an open sea. If the court is correct, this indicates that riparian
rights such as ingress and egress are now determined by ownership of
the submerged land. It is difficult to reconcile this concept with the
well-established rule, mentioned in Hayes, that, "[L]ittoral or riparian
rights are appurtenances to ownership of the uplands. They are not
founded on ownership of the submerged lands."' 6
It is submitted that the court erred in the following respects: First,
a rule which applies only to islands in a river was applied to the shore of
the Gulf of Mexico; second, the defendant's riparian rights were completely disregarded; third, the rationale provided by the Supreme Court
of Maryland17 was ignored.
It is expected that when the sea washes the land, the results will
be arbitrary, but one expects more than caprice from a court of law.
WARREN M.

SALOMON

INSURANCE-EFFECTIVE DATE DETERMINED BY PREMIUM
PAYMENT AND DELIVERY
The plaintiff's husband applied for a life insurance policy from the
defendant. The date of issue' was October 28, 1959. The policy was
delivered to the plaintiff and her husband on November 24, 1959, when
one month's premium was paid. On December 30, 1959, the insured died.
The defendant contended that the effective date of the policy was October
28, 1959, as stated on the face of the policy, and that the policy lapsed
on December 28th, 2 two days before the insured died.' The trial court
15. Id. at 802.
16. Ibid.

17. Note 13 supra.
1. 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 262 (1945). "The words 'issue,' 'issuance,' and 'issued,' in
reference to an insurance policy, are used in different senses, sometimes as meaning the
preparation and signing of the instrument by the officers of the company, as distinguished
from its delivery to the insured, and sometimes as meaning its delivery and acceptance
whereby it comes into full effect and operation as a binding mutual obligation."
2. Sixty days after October 28, 1959-thirty days coverage for which premium had
been paid plus the thirty-day grace period usually found in the standard life insurance
policy.
3. Carolina Life Ins. Co. v. DuPont, 141 So.2d 624, 625 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962). But in
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held that the effective date of the policy was November 24th, the date
of delivery and payment of the premium. On appeal, held, affirmed: the
date of delivery of the policy and payment of the first premium, not the
date on the face of the policy, is controlling in determining whether the
policy was in effect at the time of death. Carolina Life Ins. Co. v. DuPont, 141 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
The problem of determining the effective date of a life insurance
policy has arisen out of the general practice of insurers to date policies
as of the same date appearing on the application. Usually that date is
also made the due date for the payment of the premiums.4 However,
generally the provisions in the policy state that the policy shall not take
effect as a binding contract until a later validating event (most often
delivery and payment of the first premium).' The application is usually
attached to the policy and becomes a part thereof. Therefore, an inconsistency results because the policy provides that the insured's obligation
commences on an earlier date than the obligation of the insurer.'
The majority of courts7 resolve this inconsistency by holding that
the policy date should be given controlling effect in determining whether
the policy was in effect at the time of death.' In a recent New Jersey
opposition, the plaintiff contended: "[F]irst that the actual date on which the policy was
issued . . . was October 30, 1959, and that . . . the insured died while the policy was in
force, howbeit on the last day before the policy lapsed; second, that insurance became
effective on November 24, 1959, the date on which the policy was delivered to the insured
and the first premium was paid . . .. "
4. VANCE, INSURANCE 287 (2d ed. 1930).
5. See generally Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 472 (1955) ; VANCE, INSURANCE 247 (3d ed. 1951).
6. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States v. Tucker, 126 F.2d 396 (8th Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 699; American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Gregg, 123 Colo. 476, 231 P.2d
467 (1951); Parham v. National Relief Assur. Co., 33 Ga. App. 59, 125 S.E. 519 (1924);
Stramaglia v. Conservative Life Ins. Co., 319 Ill. App. 20, 48 N.E.2d 719 (1943); Wolford
v. National Life Ins. Co. of United States, 114 Kan. 411, 219 Pac. 263 (1923).
7. 29 Am. Jur. Insurance § 515 (1960); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 472 (1955).
8. Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 221 Ark. 74, 251 S.W.2d 1010 (1952) ; McDaniel
v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 185 Ark. 1160, 51 S.W.2d 981 (1932); Thomas v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 142 Cal. 79, 75 Pac. 665 (1904) ; Painter v. Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 77 Ind. App. 34, 133 N.E. 20 (1921); Wall v. Mutual Ins. Co., 228 Iowa 119,
289 N.W. 901 (1940); Timmer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 222 Iowa 1193, 270 N.W. 421, 111
A.L.R.2d 1412 (1936); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Magruder's Ex'x, 293 Ky. 551, 169 S.W.2d
317 (1943); Wilkinson v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 176 Ky. 833, 197 S.W. 557, 6
A.L.R. 769 (Ct. App. 1917); Oil Well Supply Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 214 La.
772, 38 So.2d 777 (1949); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Jankowski, 285 Mich. 291, 280
N.W. 766 (1938); Johnson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 107 Mont. 133, 83 P.2d 922
(1938); Reid v. Bankers Life Co., 148 Neb. 604, 28 N.W.2d 542 (1947); Pladwell v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 134 Misc. 205, 234 N.Y. Supp. 287 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Pace v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 219 N.C. 451, 14 S.E.2d 411 (1941); Mougey v. Union Central Life
Ins. Co., 123 Ohio St. 595, 176 N.E. 455 (1931); California State Life Ins. Co. v. Bailey,
176 Okla. 153, 54 P.2d 647 (1936) ; Sydnor v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 26 Pa. Super. 521
(1904); Brown v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 186 S.C. 245, 195 S.E. 552 (1938); Berry v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 23 Tenn. App. 485, 134 S.W.2d 886 (1939); Myers v.
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 271 S.W. 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), aff'd, 284 S.W. 216
(1926); Mercer v. South Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 111 Va. 699, 69 S.E. 961 (1911); McKenney
v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 138 Wash. 315, 244 Pac. 560 (1926) ; accord, State Secur. Life

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XVII

case,0 the court said:
When a policy, although conditioned to take effect on the payment of the first premium, expressly specifies the date from
which the premium period is to be computed and makes that

date the determining factor which fixes the day on which the
future premiums are due and payable, such date controls regardless of when the policy is delivered and notwithstanding
the policy reservation that the insurance is not effective until
the policy is delivered and the first premium paid.'"
A few courts, although arriving at the same result, follow the rule
that delivery and payment of the first premium are conditions precedent
and once they are complied with, the policy is effective as of the prior
date on the face of the policy."
Both of the above views are usually based on a finding that the
language as to the premium due dates is clear and definite, and that the
advantages of having such an important date clearly established out-

weigh any considerations of injustice in charging the insured for pro2
tection not actually afforded.1
A minority of jurisdictions has adopted the view that when the
contract expressly provides that it shall take effect only on the condition
of payment of the first premium, or on delivery, that provision controls. 8

And in the absence of circumstances requiring a different result,' 4 the
Ins. Co. v. Kitner, 175 N.E.2d 36 (Ind. App. 1961); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v.
Burch, 268 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1959).
9. Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 36, 161 A.2d 717 (1960).
10. Id. at 721. Therefore the policy lapsed after the thirty-day grace period from the
due date stated in the policy and death the next day was not within the coverage period
although the policy provided that effective coverage would not begin until delivery of the
policy and payment of the first premium.
11. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, 78 F.2d 78 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 635
(1935); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Silverstein, 53 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1931); McCampbell
v. New York Ins. Co., 288 Fed. 465, 469 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 759 (1923);
Pladwell v. Travelers Ins. Co., 134 Misc. 205, 234 N.Y. Supp. 287 (1928).
12. Ibid. See cases cited note 8 supra.
13. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Gregg, 123 Colo. 476, 231 P.2d 467 (1951); Shinall v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 91 Colo. 194, 14 P.2d 183 (1932); Parham v. National
Relief Assur. Co., 33 Ga. App. 59, 125 S.E. 519 (1924); Lentin v. Continental Assur. Co.,
412 Ill. 158, 105 N.E.2d 735 (1952); Brady v. Bankers Cas. Co., 114 Kan. 865, 220 Pac.
1033 (1923) ; Howard v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 17, 164 S.W.2d 360 (1942); Stinchcombe v. New York Life Ins. Co., 46 Ore. 316, 80 Pac. 213 (1905); Lyke v. First Nat'l
Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 41 S.D. 527, 171 N.W. 603 (1919); Great So. Life Ins. Co. v.
Alcorn, 80 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.. Civ. App. 1935).
14. The majority rule turns on the particular factual situations and particular policy
provisions involved. The minority rule is applied except when there are circumstances
requiring a contrary result. There may be the finding of a specific intent of the parties
involved that the policy commence on the earlier date. Carolina Life Ins. Co. v. DuPont,
141 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962); Lentin v. Continental Assur. Co., 412 Ill. 158, 105 N.E.2d
735 (1952).
Acts or statements of the insured recognizing the date stipulated in the policy as that
upon which premiums were due have often been held to require the conclusion that this
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delivery date and not the prior date on the policy controls the time at
which the first premiums must be paid, the expiration.date of the policy
and the running of the grace period.'"
The rationale of the minority view is that since the premiums are
payable in advance, the dating of the policy at a time prior to the date
of delivery and the subsequent payment of premiums is not sufficient to
change an. explicit provision in the policy that it take effect at a later
date. 6 This result is necessary to preclude the insured from getting
less than he bargained for, i.e. less than one term's insurance. 7
Additional basis for the minority view was given in Lentin v. Continental Assur. Co.,'8 wherein the court stated: "[A]ny confusion or
uncertainty which arises must be said to lie in the hands of the company which fashioned the conflicting provisions as to the effective date."
This reasoning was cited with approval in the CarolinaLife decision.' 9
The court in Carolina Life clearly stated that the minority view,
to give the delivery date controlling effect, is the more equitable rule to
apply when the insured dies subsequent to the delivery date. It does
not seem equitable to allow the insurer to declare the policy forfeited
before the expiration of the full term of effective insurance. To so hold
would result in the insured paying for insurance during a period when
the company was under no liability to him. This would allow the insurer
to profit by the very ambiguity which it created.
Would the result be the same if the death of the insured had occurred
subsequent to the date on the policy but prior to any delivery or payment of the first premium? It is the opinion of this author that the
Florida court would, in the circumstances just posed; give the policy date
controlling effect, thus affording coverage at the time of the insured's
date was controlling in determining whether the policy coverage had lapsed, as against
the contention that the.later date, when the, policy was delivered and the first premium
paid, should control. See Business Men's Assur. Co. of America v. Davies, 106 Colo. 51, 101
P.2d 432 (1940), where the insured constantly referred to the prior date in correspondence
with the insurer; Prange v. International Life Ins. Co., 329 Mo. 651, 46 S.W.2d 523 (1931),
wherein the policy expressly stipulated that after delivery of the policy, it shall take effect
on a specific prior date and the insured had signed an application expressing his desire to
have it dated at such earlier time. For specific provision providing that after delivery
and first premium paid, coverage shall take effect on the earlier date see Meadows v.
Continental Assur. Co., 89 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1937).
15. Shinall v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 91 Colo. 194, 14 P.2d 183 (1932); Hampe
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 21 S.W.2d 926 (Mo. App. 1929); see also cases cited note
14 supra.
16. Ibid; VANCE, INSURANCE 287 (2d ed. 1930).
17. Lentin v. Continental Assur. Co., 412 Ill. 158, 105 N.E.2d 735 (1952); accord,
Yannuzzi v. United States Cas. Co., 19 N.J. 201, 207, 115 A.2d 557 (1955); Schneider v. New
Amsterdam Cas. Co., 22 N.J. Super. 238, 243, 92 A.2d 66 (App. Div. 1952); 13 Appleman,
Insurance Law and.Practice § 7401 (1943); 1 COUCH, INsURANCE 776 (2d ed. 1959).
18. 412 Ill. 158, 167, 105 N.E.2d 735, 739 (1952).
19. Carolina Life Ins. Co. v. DuPont, 141 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
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death. Basis for this opinion is found in the court's two-fold rationale.
First, although the minority view was followed in Carolina Life, the
court qualified its adoption stating that this view was the "better
and fairer in the particular fact situation." Secondly, the court cited the
rationale of Lentin v. Continental Assur. Co.,"0 wherein it was stated
that the confusion and uncertainty as to the effective date will lie at the
hands of the company fashioning such provisions. Thus, the court has
not bound itself either to the majority or minority rule but apparently
will alternate to arrive at the more equitable result.
Insurance companies will be continually faced with unfavorable
decisions in both fact situations until they establish provisions which
entitle the insured to coverage on the same date his premiums are
payable.
RODNEY G. Ross

DEDUCTIBILITY OF THE EXPENSES OF OBTAINING A LAW
DEGREE
Taxpayer, an Internal Revenue Agent assigned to a "fraud group,"
attended night law school for three years as a degree candidate. Shortly
after he entered law school, his request was granted for transfer to the
Intelligence Division as a Special Agent.' A few months after graduating
and passing the state bar examination, the taxpayer left government
service to engage in private law practice. He claimed expense deductions
on his tax returns for amounts expended during the three-year period
for tuition and books. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the taxpayer's claim for refund on the theory that the expenses
were incurred for the primary purpose of obtaining a new skill. Held:
since the taxpayer's primary motive at the time of engaging in these
studies was to improve and maintain his existing skills, his educational
expenses were deductible. Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597
(N.D. Ohio 1962).
Until this decision, one proposition seemed certain in the area of
20. Note 18 supra.
1. A "fraud group" is a team of Special Agents, Revenue Agents, and other employees
of the Internal Revenue Service who are engaged in a special project involving suspected
acts of criminal tax evasion. Internal Revenue Agents are basically concerned with performing the audit phase of the investigation, and are primarily accountants. Special Agents of
the Intelligence Division acquire information and prepare and develop evidence to be used
at the trial of cases involving criminal tax evasion. These functions of a Special Agent, apart
from the other activities of the Internal Revenue Service, require a high degree of knowledge
of the laws of evidence, criminal procedure, trial technique, constitutional law, and other
subjects that can best be acquired through legal training.

